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A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation by Jean Tirole, Jean-Jacques Laffont

A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation Jean Tirole, Jean-Jacques Laffont ebook
ISBN: 0262121743, 9780262121743
Format: chm
Publisher: MIT
Page: 0

Other issues such as privatization and incentive theory applied to political . Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993. A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. Incentivesversustransactioncosts: atheoryofprocurementcontracts. (1993) A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA). Will be amazed how Well the different pieces fit together into a coherent “Theory of. 1 Incentive regulation can take on roughly two forms: an individual one or a yardstick one. Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation. Incentives versus transaction costs: a theory of procurement contracts. In individual 1, A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation. Tirole, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. Procurement and Supply Chain, ProXenter (University Rome Tor 'Vertical Integration and Costly Demand Information in Regulated Network 'The Theory of Incentives Applied to the Transport Sector,' with David Martimort. 11 Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, ch. Rank-order tournaments as optimal labor contracts. (1993): A theory of incentives in regulation and procurement, MIT Press.